

### **REMARKS**

This Application has been carefully reviewed in light of the Office Action. Claims 1-5, 9, 10, 14-18, 22, 23, and 27-31 are pending in the Application and stand rejected. Applicant respectfully requests reconsideration and favorable action in this case.

#### **Claim Objections**

The Office Action objects to Claims 1-5, 14-18, and 27-31, stating that none of the claims are directed to statutory subject matter. Applicant respectfully submits that these objections are improper. In particular, the M.P.E.P. clearly provides that “an ‘objection’ is made” when “the form of the claim (**as distinguished from its substance**) is improper.” M.P.E.P. 706.01 (emphasis added). Since statutory subject matter clearly goes to the substance of a claim, the claims objections are improper. Therefore, Applicant respectfully requests that the claim objections to Claims 1-5, 14-18, and 27-31 be withdrawn. Applicants further note that the Office Action also rejects these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101. These rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101 are addressed below.

#### **Rejection of Claims Regarding Enablement**

The Office Action rejects Claims 1, 14, and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, stating that the claims fail to comply with the enablement requirement. Applicant respectfully traverses. However, in order to advance prosecution, Applicant has amended Claim 1 to include “determining a plurality of results associated with the sum of terms by executing, using a processor, each of the SQL instructions.”

The test of enablement is whether one reasonably skilled in the art could make or use the invention from the disclosures in the patent coupled with the information known in the art without undue experimentation.” M.P.E.P. § 2164.01 citing *United States v. Teletronics, Inc.*, 857 F.2d 778, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The Applicant respectfully submits that this test is met by Applicant’s Specification at, for example, at least Page 6, Lines 15-16; Page 7, Lines 4-6; and Figure 2b.

Applicant notes that the Office Action specifically contends that “processor” and “determining a plurality of results” of Claim 1 does not meet the enablement requirement.

*See Office Action*, Page 22. This, however, is incorrect. With regard to “processor,” Applicant respectfully points out, as just one example, that Page 6, Lines 15-16 of the Specification expressly states “[t]he present application relates to a method of and apparatus for processing a directory service query” (emphasis added). As such, in regard to “processor” of Claim 1, the disclosure of an “apparatus for processing” would clearly allow one reasonably skilled in the art to make or use the invention without undue experimentation.

With regard to “determining a plurality of results,” Applicant respectfully points out, as just one example, that Page 7, Lines 4-6 expressly states “[a]t step 118, positive terms are executed. Step 120 tests the results of step 118 for duplicates” (emphasis added). As such, in regard to “determining a plurality of results” of Claim 1, the disclosure of both an execution, and results that follow that execution, would clearly allow one reasonably skilled in the art to make or use the invention without undue experimentation.

For at least these reasons, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejection of Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph be withdrawn.

Claims 14 and 31 include limitations analogous to “determining a plurality of results associated with the sum of terms by executing, using a processor, each of the SQL instructions.” Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above regarding Claim 1, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejections of Claims 14 and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph be withdrawn.

#### **Rejection of Claims Regarding Single Means**

The Office Action rejects Claims 10 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, stating that the claims are single means claims. Applicant respectfully traverses these rejections. The M.P.E.P. defines a single means claim as “where a means recitation does not appear in combination with another recited element of means.” M.P.E.P. 2164.08(a) (emphasis added). Based on this definition, neither of Claims 10 and 23 are single means claims. For example, Claim 10 depends from Claim 9. As such, Claim 9 combines the “means to perform X.500 or LDAP services” of Claim 10 with another recited element of means—the “database” and “processor” of Claim 9. Additionally, Claim 23 depends from

Claim 22. As such, Claim 23 combines the “means to perform X.500 or LDAP services” of Claim 23 with another recited element of means—the “database” and “processor” of Claim 22. Accordingly, neither Claim 10 nor Claim 23 meet the M.P.E.P.’s definition of a single means claim.

For at least this reason, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejection of Claims 10 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph be withdrawn.

**Rejection of Claims Regarding Indefiniteness of “collecting, into a first list ... collecting, into a second list”**

The Office Action rejects Claims 1 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, stating that the claims are indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the Applicant regards as the invention. For these rejections, the Office Action points to the limitations “collecting, into a first list ... collecting, into a second list.” Applicant respectfully traverses these rejections.

According to the M.P.E.P., “[t]he essential inquiry pertaining to this requirement is whether the claims set out and circumscribe a particular subject matter with a reasonable degree of clarity and particularity.” M.P.E.P. 2173.02. Furthermore, “[d]efiniteness of claim language must be analyzed, not in a vacuum, but in light of . . . [t]he content of the particular application disclosure.” M.P.E.P. 2173.02.

Claim 1, as amended, states:

collecting, into a first list, any of the results associated with the one or more negative terms,  
collecting, into a second list, any of the results associated with the one or more positive terms while omitting from the second list any of the results that are in the first list.

Applicant respectfully notes that these limitations of Claim 1 clearly set out and circumscribe a particular subject matter with a reasonable degree of clarity and particularity—especially in light of the following statement from Applicant’s Specification:

An alternative to the subtraction process noted above, is to **collect all negative terms in a list, and in the process of collecting all positive terms in another list, only keep the terms that are not in the negative list.**

*See Specification*, Page 10, Lines 3-5 (emphasis added).<sup>1</sup>

As such, Claim 1 satisfies the test for definiteness. Therefore, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejection of Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph be withdrawn.

Claim 14 includes limitations analogous to “collecting, into a first list, any of the results associated with the one or more negative terms” and “collecting, into a second list, any of the results associated with the one or more positive terms while omitting from the second list any of the results that are in the first list.” Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above regarding Claim 1, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejections of Claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph be withdrawn.

**Rejection of Claims Regarding Indefiniteness of “determining the plurality of results” and “processor”**

The Office Action rejects Claims 1, 11, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, stating that the claims are indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the Applicant regards as the invention. For these rejections, the Office Action points to the limitations “determining the plurality of results” and “processor.” Applicant respectfully traverses these rejections.

First, Applicant respectfully notes that the Office Action rejects Claim 11. Applicant, however, respectfully notes that **Claim 11 is withdrawn—rendering this rejection moot.**

Second, according to the M.P.E.P., “[t]he essential inquiry pertaining to this requirement is whether the claims set out and circumscribe a particular subject matter with a reasonable degree of clarity and particularity.” M.P.E.P. 2173.02. Furthermore,

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<sup>1</sup> In citing this portion of the Specification, Applicant does not intend to limit the claims to any particular embodiment. This citation merely shows that the disputed portion of Claim 1 is supported by at least a portion of the Specification.

“[d]efiniteness of claim language must be analyzed, not in a vacuum, but in light of . . . [t]he content of the particular application disclosure.” M.P.E.P. 2173.02.

Claim 1, as amended, states:

determining a plurality of results associated with the sum of terms by executing, using a processor, each of the SQL instructions.

Applicant respectfully notes that these limitations of Claim 1 set out and circumscribe a particular subject matter with a reasonable degree of clarity and particularity—especially in light of the Applicant’s Specification at, for example, at least Page 6, Lines 15-16; Page 7, Lines 4-6; and Figure 2b.

In particular, with regard to “processor,” Applicant respectfully points out, as just one example, that Page 6, Lines 15-16 of the Specification expressly states “[t]he present application relates to a method of and **apparatus for processing** a directory service query” (emphasis added). In light of this disclosure of Applicant’s Specification, it is clear that the limitation of “processor” of Claim 1 clearly sets out and circumscribes a particular subject matter with a reasonable degree of clarity and particularity.

With regard to “determining a plurality of results,” Applicant respectfully points out, as just one example, that Page 7, Lines 4-6 expressly states “[a]t step 118, positive terms **are executed**. Step 120 **tests the results** of step 118 for duplicates” (emphasis added). As such, In light of this disclosure of Applicant’s Specification, it is clear that the limitation of “determining a plurality of results” of Claim 1 clearly sets out and circumscribes a particular subject matter with a reasonable degree of clarity and particularity.

As such, Claim 1 satisfies the test for definiteness. Therefore, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejection of Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph be withdrawn.

Claim 14 includes limitations analogous to “determining a plurality of results associated with the sum of terms by executing, using a processor, each of the SQL instructions.” Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above regarding Claim 1,

Applicant respectfully requests that the rejection of Claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph be withdrawn.

**Rejection of Claims Regarding Indefiniteness of “operable”**

The Office Action rejects Claim 1, stating that “operable” is not a definite term. Applicant respectfully traverses.

First, Applicant respectfully notes that **Claim 1 does not include “operable.” As such, this rejection of Claim 1 is moot.** However, since Claims 9 and 22 include “operable,” Applicant will address the substance of this rejection.

Second, according to the M.P.E.P., “[t]he essential inquiry pertaining to this requirement is whether the claims set out and circumscribe a particular subject matter with a reasonable degree of clarity and particularity.” M.P.E.P. 2173.02. Furthermore, “[d]efiniteness of claim language must be analyzed, not in a vacuum, but in light of . . . [t]he content of the particular application disclosure.” M.P.E.P. 2173.02.

In light of this, Applicant respectfully notes that a claim element described as “operable” to perform certain functions covers operations that the element is capable of performing, and not just operations that the element may be capable of performing. The ordinary dictionary definition of “operable” is “practicable.” *See, e.g.,* The American Heritage College Dictionary, 3rd Ed., Houghton Mifflin (1997). The dictionary definition of “practicable” is “capable of being affected, done or put into practice.” *See id.* Thus, elements following the term “operable” to in a particular claim element constitute operations that the claim element is capable of performing. Operations that a claim element is capable of performing are limitations because the element is thus distinguished from the prior art that is not capable of performing the operations.

Additionally, “operable” is a commonly used term in patent application claims and is present in claims of numerous patents issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office. An informal search of the USPTO’s website (performed March 22, 2009) returned well over 150,000 issued patents with claims reciting the phrases “operable to” or “being

operable to.” Applicant respectfully contends that use of the term “operable” is proper. In short, use of the term “operable” in claims is a practice that is both well accepted and currently supported by the PTO. To the extent that the Examiner intends to maintain his position with respect to the phrase “operable,” Applicant respectfully requests the Examiner to provide support from applicable authority, such as case law or statutes.

For at least these reasons, Applicant respectfully submits that the use of the phrase “operable” in Claims 9 and 22 does not render these claims indefinite.

**Rejection of Claims Regarding Indefiniteness of “processor”**

The Office Action rejects Claims 1, 9, 14, 22, and 31 under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, stating that the claims are indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the Applicant regards as the invention. For these rejections, the Office Action points to the limitation “processor.” Applicant respectfully traverses these rejections.

According to the M.P.E.P., “[t]he essential inquiry pertaining to this requirement is whether the claims set out and circumscribe a particular subject matter with a reasonable degree of clarity and particularity.” M.P.E.P. 2173.02. Furthermore, “[d]efiniteness of claim language must be analyzed, not in a vacuum, but in light of . . . [t]he content of the particular application disclosure.” M.P.E.P. 2173.02.

Applicant respectfully notes that the term “processor” of Claim 1 clearly sets out and circumscribes a particular subject matter with a reasonable degree of clarity and particularity—especially in light of the Applicant’s Specification at, for example, at least Page 6, Lines 15-16; Page 7, Lines 4-6; and Figure 2b.

In particular, with regard to “processor,” Applicant respectfully points out, as just one example, that Page 6, Lines 15-16 of the Specification expressly states “[t]he present application relates to a method of and **apparatus for processing** a directory service query” (emphasis added). In light of this disclosure of Applicant’s Specification, it is clear that the

term “processor” of Claim 1 clearly sets out and circumscribes a particular subject matter with a reasonable degree of clarity and particularity.

Furthermore, Applicant respectfully notes that the Office Action contends that although Applicant’s Specification discloses “processing,” it does not disclose a “processor.” Applicants respectfully traverses this contention. As noted above, Applicant’s Specification clearly states “apparatus for processing.” One of ordinary skill in the art would clearly understand that an **“apparatus for processing” includes a processor.**

As such, Claim 1 satisfies the test for definiteness. Therefore, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejections of Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph be withdrawn.

Claims 9, 14, 22, and 31 include limitations analogous to “processor.” Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above regarding Claim 1, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejections of Claims 9, 14, 22, and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph be withdrawn.

#### **Rejection of Claims Regarding Indefiniteness of “means”**

The Office Action rejects Claims 10 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, stating that no function is specified by the word preceding means. Applicants respectfully traverses this rejection.

Although the M.P.E.P. requires that “words which precede ‘means’ to convey a function to be performed,” the M.P.E.P. **also provides an exception.** See M.P.E.P. 706.03(d), Examiner Note. In particular, the M.P.E.P. clearly states that the requirement **is met** “if the phrase can be restated as ‘means for \_\_\_\_\_,’ and it **still makes sense.**” M.P.E.P. 706.03(d), Examiner Note. Furthermore, the phrase will make sense if it has a “functional connotation.” See M.P.E.P. 706.03(d), Examiner Note.

Claim 10 states “[t]he system as claimed in claim 9, further comprising means **to perform X.500 or LDAP services**” (emphasis added). Clearly, the phrase “to perform

X.500 or LDAP services” of Claim 10 has a “functional connotation.” Accordingly, Claim 10 meets the requirement of M.P.E.P. 706.03(d).

As such, Claim 10 is definite. Therefore, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejection of Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph be withdrawn.

Claim 23 include limitations analogous to “means to perform X.500 or LDAP services.” Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above regarding Claim 10, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejection of Claim 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph be withdrawn.

**Rejections of Claims 1-5, 14-18, and 27-31 Under Section 101**

The Office Action rejects Claims 1-5, 14-18, and 27-31 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, stating that the claims are not directed towards statutory matter. Applicant respectfully traverses these rejections.

Claim 1, as amended, states:

determining a plurality of results associated with the sum of terms by executing, using a processor, each of the SQL instructions.

(emphasis added). That is, the claim, as amended, includes a processor. Accordingly, Claim 1 is allowable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

For at least this reason, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejection of Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 be withdrawn.

Claims 2-5 and 27-30 each depend, either directly or indirectly, from Claim 1. Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above with regard to Claim 1, Claims 2-5 and 27-30 are allowable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Claim 14 includes limitations analogous to “determining a plurality of results associated with the sum of terms by executing, using a processor, each of the SQL instructions.” Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above regarding Claim 1,

Applicant respectfully requests that the rejection of Claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 be withdrawn.

Claims 15-18 each depend, either directly or indirectly, from Claim 14. Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above with regard to Claim 14, Claims 15-18 are allowable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

**Rejections of Claims 9-10 and 22-23 Under Section 101**

The Office Action rejects Claims 9-10 and 22-23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, stating that the claims are directed to program per se. Applicant respectfully traverses these rejections.

In particular, the Office Action contends that Claim 9 is only “claiming a computer program and functional descriptive material consisting of data structures and computer programs . . . and [is] therefore non-statutory.” *See Office Action*, Page 8. This, however, is incorrect because Claim 9 states:

**a processor** that is communicatively coupled to the database and that processes a service query . . .

(emphasis added). That is, Claim 9 includes **a processor—which is an otherwise statutory machine**. Since Claim 9 includes “an otherwise statutory manufacture or machine, . . . **the claim remains statutory** irrespective of the fact that a computer program is included in the claim.” M.P.E.P. 2106.01(I) (emphasis added).

Applicant further notes that the Office Action contends that “neither the drawings nor the specification supports” the “processor” of Claim 1. This, however, is incorrect. For example, the Applicant’s Specification at, for example, Page 6, Lines 15-16 clearly states:

The present application relates to a method of **and apparatus for processing** a directory service query.

(emphasis added). That is, Applicant’s Specification discloses an **apparatus for processing**. One of ordinary skill in the art would clearly understand that an **“apparatus for processing” includes a processor**.

For at least these reasons, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejection of Claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 be withdrawn.

Claim 10 depends from Claim 9. Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above with regard to Claim 9, Claim 10 is allowable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

Claim 22 includes limitations analogous to “a processor that is communicatively coupled to the database and that processes a service query by: . . . determining a plurality of results associated with the sum of terms by executing each of the SQL instructions.” Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above regarding Claim 1, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejection of Claim 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 be withdrawn.

Claim 23 depends from Claim 22. Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above with regard to Claim 22, Claim 23 is allowable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

#### **Claim Rejections Under Section 103**

The Office Action rejects Claims 1-5, 9-10, 14-18, 22-23, and 27-31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 6,356,892 to Corn et al. (“*Corn*”) in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,112,198 to Lohman et al. (“*Lohman*”) and U.S. Patent No. 5,412,804 to Krishna et al. (“*Krishna*”). Applicant respectfully traverses these rejections for at least the reasons discussed below.

##### **A. *Corn, Lohman, and Krishna* fails to disclose “collecting, into a first list, any of the results” of Claim 1**

Claim 1 is directed to a method of processing a database service query. The method includes “determining a plurality of results associated with the sum of terms by executing, using a processor, each of the SQL instructions,” and “collecting, into a first list, any of the results associated with the one or more negative terms.” Neither *Corn*, *Lohman*, nor *Krishna* disclose each of these limitations.

The Office Action relies on “EID sets” of *Corn* as disclosing “results” of the prior version of Claim 1. *See Office Action*, Page 9. The “EID sets” of *Corn*, however, clearly fail to disclose “results” of amended Claim 1. For example, Claim 1 expressly states “determining a plurality of results associated with the sum of terms by executing, using a processor, each of the SQL instructions,” and “collecting, into a first list, any of the results associated with the one or more negative terms” (emphasis added). That is, the results that are collected in Claim 1 are the same results that are determined “by executing, using a processor, each of the SQL instructions.” The “EID sets” of *Corn*, however, fail to disclose each of these limitations. In particular, *Corn* expressly disclose that the “EID sets” of *Corn* are merely merged into an SQL query. *See Corn*, Col. 7, Lines 42-44. Since the “EID sets” of *Corn* are merged into an SQL query prior to its execution, the “EID sets” of *Corn* clearly cannot disclose “results” that are determined “by executing, using a processor, each of the SQL instructions” of Claim 1.

For at least this reason, *Corn* fails to disclose, teach, or suggest the limitations of Claim 1. Furthermore, neither *Lohman* nor *Krishna* cure this deficiency. Therefore, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejection of Claim 1 be withdrawn.

Claims 2-5 and 27-30 each depend, either directly or indirectly, from Claim 1. Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above with regard to Claim 1, Claims 2-5 and 27-30 are allowable.

Claims 9, 14, 22, and 31 include limitations analogous to “determining a plurality of results associated with the sum of terms by executing, using a processor, each of the SQL instructions,” and “collecting, into a first list, any of the results associated with the one or more negative terms.” For at least those reasons discussed above with regard to Claim 1, Applicant respectfully contends that neither *Corn*, *Lohman*, nor *Krishna* disclose each of these limitations. Therefore, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejections of Claims 9, 14, 22, and 31 be withdrawn.

Claims 10, 15-18, 23, depend, either directly or indirectly, from Claims 9, 14, and 22, respectively. Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above with regard to Claims 9, 14, and 22, Claims 10, 15-18, 23 are allowable.

**B. *Corn, Lohman, and Krishna* fails to disclose “collecting, into a first list, any of the results,” and “collecting, into a second list, any of the results” of Claim 1**

Claim 1 is directed to a method of processing a database service query. The method further includes: “determining a plurality of results associated with the sum of terms by executing, using a processor, each of the SQL instructions,” “collecting, into a first list, any of the results associated with the one or more negative terms,” and “collecting, into a second list, any of the results associated with the one or more positive terms.” Neither *Corn*, *Lohman*, nor *Krishna* disclose each of these limitations.

The Office Action relies on the merging of EID sets into SQL queries of *Corn* to disclose a prior version of Claim 1. *See Office Action*, Page 9. The merging of EID sets into SQL queries of *Corn*, however, fails to disclose the limitations of amended Claim 1. First, **the Office Action fails to explain** how the disclosure of merging of EID set into SQL queries of *Corn* discloses, in any way, “collecting, into a first list, any of the results . . . ” and “collecting, into a second list, any of the results . . . .”

Second, Applicant submits that the merging of EID set into SQL queries of *Corn* does not disclose these limitations. In particular, the limitations of Claim 1 recite “results.” *Corn*, however, fails to disclose that “EID sets” of *Corn* are **results**. Instead, *Corn* only discloses that these EID sets are merely merged in SQL queries **which have yet to be executed**. *See Corn*, Col. 7, Lines 42-44. Thus, the “EID sets” of *Corn* are clearly not results—especially in light of the fact that Claim 1 clearly states that the “results” of Claim 1 are determined “by executing, using a processor, each of the SQL instructions.” Since the “EID sets” of *Corn* are clearly not “results” of Claim 1, merely merging the “EID sets” into SQL queries clearly fails to disclose “collecting, **into a first list, any of the results** . . . ” and “collecting, **into a second list, any of the results** . . . ” of Claim 1 (emphasis added).

For at least this reason, *Corn* fails to disclose, teach, or suggest the limitations of Claim 1. Furthermore, neither *Lohman* nor *Krishna* cure this deficiency. Therefore, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejection of Claim 1 be withdrawn.

Claims 2-5 and 27-30 each depend, either directly or indirectly, from Claim 1. Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above with regard to Claim 1, Claims 2-5 and 27-30 are allowable.

Claims 9, 14, 22, and 31 include limitations analogous to “determining a plurality of results associated with the sum of terms by executing, using a processor, each of the SQL instructions,” “collecting, into a first list, any of the results associated with the one or more negative terms,” and “collecting, into a second list, any of the results associated with the one or more positive terms.” For at least those reasons discussed above with regard to Claim 1, Applicant respectfully contends that neither *Corn*, *Lohman*, nor *Krishna* disclose each of these limitations. Therefore, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejections of Claims 9, 14, 22, and 31 be withdrawn.

Claims 10, 15-18, 23, depend, either directly or indirectly, from Claims 9, 14, and 22, respectively. Therefore, for at least the reasons discussed above with regard to Claims 9, 14, and 22, Claims 10, 15-18, 23 are allowable.

**CONCLUSION**


Applicant has made an earnest attempt to place this case in condition for allowance. For the foregoing reasons and for other reasons clearly apparent, Applicant respectfully requests reconsideration and full allowance of all pending claims.

If there are matters that can be discussed by telephone to further the prosecution of this Application, Applicant invites the Examiner to call Luke K. Pedersen at the Examiner's convenience.

Applicant hereby take an extension of time for responding to the Office Action dated December 24, 2008 for one month from March 24, 2009 to April 24, 2009. The Commissioner is hereby authorized to change the one-month extension fee in the amount of \$130.00 and any fees or credit any overpayment to Deposit Account No. 02-0384 of Baker Botts L.L.P.

Respectfully submitted,

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